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Abstract 
Creativity is thought to involve searching and selecting 
amongst multiple discrete idea candidates. Honing theory 
predicts that it involves actualizing the potentiality of as few 
as a single ill-defined idea by viewing it from different 
contexts. This paper reports on a study that tests between 
these theories. Participants were invited to “Create a painting 
that expresses yourself in any style that appeals to you,” and 
asked “Were all of your ideas for your painting distinct and 
separate ideas?” Naïve judges were provided with 
descriptions of the two theories of creativity, sample answers, 
and practice responses to classify. The judges were 
significantly more likely to classify the artists’ responses as 
‘H’, indicative of honing theory rather than ‘S’ indicative of a 
search/select view of creativity. 
Keywords: Art; Creative process; Honing; Potentiality; 
search space. 
Introduction 
Creative processes are commonly thought to involve search 
through a space of possibilities, or the generation of 
multiple discrete, well-defined candidate ideas followed by 
selection and exploration of the most promising of them 
(Runco, 2006). It might seem self-evident that this is the 
case; how could it be otherwise? However, a different view 
of creativity is suggested by work on a theory of concepts 
designed to tackle the difficult problem of modeling how 
concepts combine. The theory that emerged out of this 
work, honing theory predicts that creativity involves the 
merging and interference of memory items resulting in as 
few as a single cognitive structure that is ill-defined, and can 
be said to exist in a state of potentiality, and which can be 
formally described as a superposition state. The idea 
becomes increasingly well-defined, and transforms from 
potential to actual through interaction with both internally 
generated and externally generated contexts. The idea could 
actualize in different ways depending on the contexts the 
idea interacts with, or perspectives it is viewed from. 
Elements of the seed idea have the potential to grow 
organically out of earlier elements. In short, honing theory 
posits that creative ideation involves actualizing the 
potentiality of as few as a single ill-defined idea by viewing 
it from different contexts.  
These different views of creativity make very different 
predictions about the state of an idea mid-way through a 
creative process. This paper reports on a study designed to 
test between these theories by asking individuals engaged in 
an art-making task about their conception of their painting 
mid-way through their creative process. 
Background 
Inspired by the metaphor of the mind as a computer (or 
computer program), early research on creativity focused on 
the notion of heuristic search, in which rules of thumb guide 
the inspection of different states within a particular state 
space (set of possible solutions) until a satisfactory solution 
is found (Eysenck, 1993; Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1957; 
Newell & Simon, 1972). In heuristic search, the relevant 
variables are defined up front; thus the state space is 
generally fixed. Examples of heuristics include breaking the 
problem into sub-problems, hill-climbing (reiteratively 
modifying the current state to look more like the goal state), 
and working backward from the goal state to the initial 
state.  
The idea that creativity could be construed as heuristically 
guided search gave hope to those who sought a scientific 
understanding of creativity because search is a formally 
tractable process. However it was soon recognized that in 
many creative tasks, and particularly artistic forms of 
creativity, the goal state is unspecified, and some elements 
of the eventual solution may not be present when the 
problem presents itself. It has been suggested that creativity 
involves heuristics that guide the search for, not a possibility 
within a given state space, but a new state space itself (e.g., 
Boden, 1990; Kaplan & Simon, 1990, Ohlsson, 1992). 
One of the most well known theories of creativity is the 
Geneplore model (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992). This 
theory posits that the creative process consists of two stages: 
generate and explore. (Indeed the name ‘Geneplore’ is a 
condensation of ‘generate’ and ‘explore’.) The first stage 
involves the generation of crudely formed ideas referred to 
as pre-inventive structures that contain the kernel of an idea 
as opposed to an idea in its entirety. The exploration stage 
involves fleshing out these pre-inventive structures through 
elaboration and testing. Use of the term ‘exploration’ to 
refer to the second phase of the creative process can be 
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misleading because the term ‘explore’ is often used to refer 
to surveying the space of possibilities as generally occurs 
during the first phase of the creative process, as opposed to 
refining a single possibility as generally occurs during the 
second phase. However, the notion of a pre-inventive 
structure does capture the intuition that early on in the 
creative process one is working with cognitive structures 
that are different in kind from those one is working with 
later in the creative process. The Geneplore model does not 
attempt to formalize how a pre-inventive structure differs 
from a full-fledged idea, nor what differentiates a promising 
pre-inventive structure from a mundane one.  
Another well-known theory of creativity is the Darwinian 
theory of creativity (Campbell 1960; Simonton, 1999, 2007, 
2010). As do biological species, creative ideas exhibit the 
kind of complexity and adaptation over time that is 
indicative of an evolutionary process, not just when they are 
expressed to others, but in the mind of a single creator 
(Gabora, 1997; Terrell, Hunt & Gosden, 1997; Thagard, 
1980; Tomasello 1996). Thus it has been proposed that in 
creativity, as in natural selection, there is a process 
conducive to generating variety, and another conducive to 
pruning out inferior variants. According to the Darwinian 
theory, we generate new ideas through an essentially a trial-
and-error process involving ‘Blind’ generation of ideational 
Variants followed by Selective Retention of the fittest 
variants for development into a finished product. Thus the 
Darwinian theory is sometimes referred to as BVSR. The 
variants are said to be blind in the sense that the creator has 
no subjective certainty about whether they are a step in the 
direction of the final creative product.  
A different view of creativity is suggested by work on a 
“quantum” theory of concepts designed to tackle the 
difficult problem of modeling how concepts combine 
(Aerts, 2009; Aerts, Aerts, & Gabora, 2009; Aerts, 
Broekaert, Gabora, & Veloz, 2012; Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 
2013; Busemeyer, & Bruza, 2012; Gabora, & Aerts, 2002). 
This theory was developed to cope with the contextuality 
and noncompositionality of concepts, which make them 
resistant to formal description. The mathematical formalism 
of quantum mechanics was developed to describe 
phenomena that were first observed in the quantum world 
but that appear also in psychology. One advantage of a 
quantum model over a classical one is that it uses variables 
and spaces that are defined specifically with respect to a 
particular context. The quantum formalism provides a 
natural spatial representation of a state in a context such that 
variables are natively context specific. 
This theory of concepts led to an alternative view of how 
the creative process works (Gabora, 2005). Honing theory 
purports that initially a creative idea exists in an ill-defined 
state of potentiality that can be formally described as a 
superposition state. This “seed idea” is experienced as vague 
because it consists of components potentially derived from 
multiple sources merged together, and the challenge is to 
hone it into a well-defined whole. The seed idea transforms 
from potential to actual through interaction with both 
internally generated and externally generated contexts. This 
theory proposes that the idea could actualize in different 
ways, depending on the contexts the idea interacts with, and 
that the elements of the idea, have the potential to grow 
organically out of earlier elements. This theory was in part 
inspired by extensive discussion with creative individuals, 
who invariably describe their creative process as involving 
thinking about an idea from different perspectives as 
opposed to search and selecting amongst candidate ideas. 
The hypothesis that creative thinking involves, not 
generating and selecting amongst multiple well-formed 
candidates, but superposition of relevant memory items to 
give as few as a single candidate that undergoes honing, was 
tested in an analogy making task (Gabora & Saab, 2011). 
The ‘search and select’ view is assumed in the structure 
mapping (SM) theory of analogy (Gentner, 1983), according 
to which (in brief) analogy generation occurs in two steps: 
first, searching memory in a “structurally blind” manner 
(Gentner, 2010, p. 753) for an appropriate source and 
aligning it with the target, and second, mapping the correct 
one-to-one correspondences between the source and the 
target. Thus, structure mapping assumes that candidate 
sources are considered separately, and once the correct 
source is found the analogy making process occurs in 
isolation from the rest of the contents of mind. This stands 
in contrast to honing theory in several respects. First, quite 
the opposite of being “structurally blind”, the initial stage of 
analogy making is thought to be constrained by the content-
addressable structure of associative memory to retrieve 
items that are in some way (although not necessarily the 
right or most relevant way) structurally similar (Gabora, 
2010). Second, honing theory suggests that alignment and 
mapping may work with, not discrete, predefined structures, 
but an amalgam of multiple items previously encoded to the 
neural cell assemblies activated by the target, which in the 
present context are not readily separated. Third, the process 
is thought to proceed not by mapping more correspondences 
but by weeding out non-correspondences. 
Participants in the analogy problem solving study were 
interrupted midway through solving an analogy problem 
and asked what they were thinking in terms of a solution. 
Naïve judges categorized a response as H if it met the 
predictions of honing theory, i.e., if there was evidence of 
merging solution sources from memory resulting in an ill-
defined idea. They categorized it as SM if it met the 
predictions of structure mapping, i.e., if participants had not 
finished mapping relations from source to target. Both the 
frequency counts and mean number of SM versus H 
judgments supported the hypothesis derived from honing 
theory that midway through creative processing an idea is in 
a potentiality state. 
This was a first source of empirical evidence that creative 
thinking is divergent not in the sense that it moves in 
multiple directions or generates multiple possibilities, but in 
the sense that it produces a raw idea that is vague or 
unfocused, that requires further processing to become 
viable. However, analogy problem solving is a highly 
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constrained task, with a single correct solution, and one 
could argue that this is uncharacteristic of most creative 
tasks. The goal of the current research is to show that the 
honing theory of creativity is broader than just analogy 
problem solving, that it applies to less constrained, open-
ended task such as art making. This is the first study to 
investigate between the above two views of how the creative 
processes works using an open-ended task. We 
hypothesized that midway through the process of 
completing a painting the mind of the artist is in a state of 
potentiality, i.e., the idea the artist has is vague or half-
baked, and in different contexts it could manifest different 
ways. We propose that the creative process works through 
honing an idea such that it transforms from ill-defined to 
well-defined, as opposed to search and selection from 
amongst a collection of well-formed candidate ideas. 
Attempting to distinguish between these competing theories 
of creativity helps us to understand how creative ideas arise 
and take shape, and thus enables us to gain insight into 
human innovation. 
Method 
The study consisted of two components, carried out 
separately. The first involved the generation of artworks and 
the answering of questions concerning the art-making 
process. The second involved classifying these responses in 
ways that were indicative of either honing theory or a search 
and select type theory. 
Participants 
The participants were undergraduates enrolled in 
psychology courses at the University of British Columbia 
who were participating in order to receive class credit. 
There were two types of participants: 56 who created 
paintings and answered questionnaires, who will be referred 
to as artists, and 11 who judged the artists’ answers to the 
questionnaires, who will be referred to as judges. All 
participants were naïve concerning the rationale for the 
study.  
Protocol for Artists  
Materials Between two and eight artists participated at a 
time. The artists’ were seated at desks placed in a circle, 
with each individual facing outwards, such that they could 
not see each others’ art. Each artist’s desk had paintbrushes 
of two different of sizes and an ice cube tray containing 
seven different colors (pink, white, yellow, green, brown, 
blue, and red) of acrylic paint. Each desk also had a glass of 
water and towelettes for cleaning the paintbrushes, and a 
plastic plate for mixing colors. Additionally, on the desk 
was a set of ten Crayola washable watercolor paints in 
plastic jars, pencil crayon pastels, chalk pastels, oil pastels, 
and two pieces of paper towel, a piece of watercolor paper, 
and a piece of paper for acrylic paints.  
Handouts and Art-making Protocol Each artist was also 
provided with a set of handouts. The first was a consent 
form, and the second was a Demographics Questionnaire. 
Form A asked them to “Create a painting that expresses 
yourself in any style that appeals to you.” The experimenter 
told them that their artwork would not be judged in any 
way, and that it was only their answers to questions on 
Forms B, C, and D that would be analyzed. They were told 
that the study was concerned with peoples’ perceptions of 
the creative process of art making. They were told where 
and when they could pick up their painting if they wished 
to, and that if they did not pick it up it would be destroyed 
after one year. They were also told that none of the artwork 
would be photographed. 
Before beginning the painting they were asked to fill in 
Form B, which asked:  
What	  are	  you	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  your	  painting	  will	  
look	  like?	  Write	  down	  your	  thoughts	  about	  your	  painting	  
in	  as	  much	  detail	  as	  you	  can.	  	  
They were asked to start painting as soon as they finished 
writing their answer to the question on Form B.  
After 15 minutes the artists were interrupted and given 
Form C, which asked them to: 
Write	  down	  your	  thoughts	  about	  the	  painting	  in	  as	  much	  
detail	  as	  you	  can.	  
After they finished responding to Form C they were asked 
to continue their painting until it was finished.  
Once they had completed their painting they were given 
Form D, which asked: 
Were	   all	   of	   your	   ideas	   for	   your	   painting	   distinct	   and	  
separate	  ideas?	  
In a Pilot Study with 15 participants there was an 
additional question on Form D that asked: Do you think 
being interrupted affected how you carried out your 
painting? Since all of the participants answered “no” to this 
question it was thereafter omitted. (Had any of them 
answered “yes” we would have omitted Form C.) 
When the artists completed Form D they were debriefed 
and asked if they had any questions regarding the study. 
They all completed the procedure within ninety minutes. 
Judging 
The judges did not see or evaluate any of the actual 
artworks; all they looked at was the artists’ questionnaire 
responses. Each judge was provided with a set of handouts. 
As with the artists, the first two were a consent form and a 
demographics questionnaire. The third handout described 
the criteria they were to use to classify artist answers as 
indicating of one theory or the other. It read as follows: 
  
JUDGING	  CRITERIA	  	  
You	  will	  be	  trained	  how	  to	  read	  information	  about	  artists’	  
art-­‐making	   processes	   and	   then	   put	   them	   into	   two	  
categories:	  one	  that	  you	  think	  is	   indicative	  of	  one	  theory	  
about	   the	   creative	  art-­‐making	  process,	   and	  another	   that	  
is	  indicative	  of	  another	  theory.	  You	  will	  first	  be	  given	  the	  
identifying	   characteristics	   of	   Theory	   S	   or	   Theory	   H.	   You	  
will	  practice	  on	  toy	  examples	  until	  your	  answers	   indicate	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that	  you	  understand	  the	  distinction	  between	  H	  and	  S,	  and	  
until	   you	   yourself	   claim	   that	   you	   understand	   this	  
distinction.	  Then	  you	  will	   classify	   the	  real	   responses	  as	  S	  
or	  H.	  	  
	  
Identifying	  Characteristics	  of	  Theory	  S	  -­‐ If	  multiple	  ideas	  are	  given,	  they	  are	  considered	  separate	  
and	  distinct	  from	  one	  another;	  not	  hard	  to	  dis-­‐entangle.	  -­‐ Does	  not	  contain	  extra	  ideas	  that	  would	  be	  relevant	  to	  
other	  types	  of	  paintings	  or	  creative	  tasks	  but	  that	  are	  
irrelevant	  to	  this	  particular	  painting.	  -­‐ Distinct	  possible	  ways	  of	  going	  about	  the	  task	  may	  be	  
separated	  by	  words	  such	  as	  “or”	  without	  anything	  to	  
indicate	  these	  two	  ways	  are	  connected	  in	  creator’s	  
mind.	  -­‐ The	  creative	  process	  involves	  searching	  one’s	  mind	  for	  
ways	  to	  go	  about	  the	  painting	  and	  selecting	  amongst	  
these	  distinct	  possible	  outcomes.	  -­‐ No	  common	  core	  to	  possible	  painting	  outcomes.	  -­‐ No	  new	  emergent	  characteristics	  of	  painting	  come	  to	  
light	  through	  process	  of	  resolving	  how	  initial	  idea	  for	  
painting	  will	  be	  carried	  out.	  
	  
Identifying	  Characteristics	  of	  Theory	  H	  -­‐ If	  multiple	  ideas	  are	  given,	  they	  are	  jumbled	  together;	  
hard	  to	  dis-­‐entangle.	  -­‐ Contains	  extra	  ideas	  that	  would	  be	  relevant	  to	  other	  
types	  of	  creative	  tasks	  but	  that	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  
creating	  this	  particular	  painting.	  -­‐ Ill-­‐defined	  or	  indistinct	  ideas;	  challenge	  is	  to	  make	  them	  
concrete.	  -­‐ Common	  core	  to	  different	  possible	  painting	  outcomes;	  
core	  could	  be	  taken	  in	  different	  directions.	  -­‐ Words	  indicative	  of	  H	  theory:	  vague,	  ill-­‐defined,	  
indistinct,	  potential.	  -­‐ New	  emergent	  characteristics	  of	  painting,	  or	  new	  self-­‐
understanding,	  come	  to	  light	  through	  process	  of	  
resolving	  how	  initial	  idea	  for	  painting	  will	  be	  carried	  
out;	  transformative. 
 
Note:	   It	   is	  not	  necessary	   to	  meet	  all	   the	  criteria	   in	  order	   to	  be	  
properly	  classified	  as	  indicative	  of	  one	  theory	  of	  the	  other.	  	  Also,	  
it	   is	  not	  necessary	   to	  distribute	  your	  classifications	  evenly;	   it	   is	  
possible	   that	  5	   in	  a	   row	  might	  be	   indicative	  of	  one	   theory	  and	  
not	  the	  other.	  In	  fact	  it	  is	  completely	  possible	  that	  they	  all	  could	  
be	  one	  theory	  and	  not	  the	  other.	  Please	  classify	  each	  answer	  as	  
indicative	  of	  one	  theory	  or	  the	  other	  even	  if	  you	  are	  not	  sure	  of	  
your	  answer.	  
 
The Judging Criteria Handout also contained a summary of 
differences between the two theories provided in Table 1. 
The judges were told that a flat-out ‘yes’ to ‘Were all of 
your ideas for your painting distinct and separate ideas?’ 
was indicative of S and a flat-out ‘no’ was indicative of H. 
The judges were given the 56 questionnaires, and a form 
on which to classify the artists’ answers as indicative of 
either H or S. They were told “If you are not sure just go 
with your gut feeling”. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics used to judge responses as Search 
and Select (S) versus Honing (H). 
 S	   H	  
If multiple ideas 
are given, they 
are 
Distinct (e.g., 
complete ideas 
separated by 
‘or’) 
Jumbled together 
(e.g., idea 
fragments spliced 
together) 
Ideas are Well-defined; 
need to be 
tweaked / 
mutated and 
selected 
amongst 
Ill-defined; need to 
be made concrete; 
later elements 
emerge from earlier 
ones 
Common core to 
ideas? 
Never Yes or sometimes  
Emergent 
properties of 
painting? 
No Yes 
Emergent self-
understanding? 
No Yes 
Emphasis External 
product 
Internal 
transformation 
Results  
Not all artists answered every question, and not all judges 
provided a judgment of every artist response. The intra class 
correlation (ICC) for the degree of agreement amongst the 
judges’ classifications of the responses for Forms B and C 
were too low to use and so were excluded from the analysis. 
For the question on Form D the ICC was .94, indicating 
high reliability.  
Artist responses were classified as supporting honing 
theory if 6 or more judges judged it as H, and as supporting 
search and select if 6 or more judges judged it as S. As 
shown in Figure 1, 29 of the artist responses were classified 
by the judges as supporting of theory H, and 13 were 
classified as supporting theory S. A one-sample chi-square 
test revealed a statistically significant difference between 
the classifications for theory H and S, χ2(1, N = 43) = 4.57, 
p < .05. Thus the frequency counts support the hypothesis 
that the creative process involves actualization of the 
potential of as few as one single ill-defined idea, as 
predicted by honing theory, as opposed to searching and 
selecting from amongst multiple discrete variants, as 
predicted by theories such as BVSR.  
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Figure 1: Frequency count of judgments for Honing Theory 
(H), on left (N = 29) and Search and Select Theory (S), on 
right. (N = 13). 
 
A further analysis compared the mean number of 
judgments (out of a maximum of 11, the total number of 
judges) across all responses that supported each theory. 
Taking the mean across all 56 responses, the mean number 
of S judgments was 9.67 (SD = 0.47), and the mean number 
of H judgments was 4.35 (SD = 0.47). A paired-sample t-
test showed that the difference was significant t(55) = 2.64, 
p < .05), and the effect size (η2 = .38) was large. Thus these 
data corroborate the above frequency count findings. The 
mean judgment scores for structure mapping and actualizing 
potentiality are given in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean number of ratings of H (indicative of honing 
theory) on the left and S (indicative of a search and select 
view of creativity) on the right (M = 4.33, SD = 0.47). 
Discussion 
This study investigated whether the mind of the artist is in a 
state of potentiality midway through the open-ended 
creative task of art making, helping us to better understand 
how the creative process works. Our goal was to determine 
if creative ideas arise through the generation of multiple, 
discrete, well-defined possibilities that are then explored, 
tweaked, and selected amongst, or if creative ideas arise 
through the merging of memory items resulting in a single 
cognitive structure that is ill defined, thus existing in a state 
of potentiality that becomes more well-defined as it interacts 
with internally or externally generated contexts. Our results 
support the hypothesis that the creative process works 
through honing—actualization of potentiality—as opposed 
to search and selection. Although this hypothesis had 
previously found support with respect to analogy problem 
solving (Gabora & Saab, 2011), this is the first study to 
investigate and support that it also holds true for this open-
ended creative task of art making.  
The data collected for the study reported here was part 
of an Honours Student project and it was carried out with 
the view of ironing out the kinks in the procedure and 
thereby paving the way for a larger study of this sort in the 
future. There are several limitations to the research reported 
here. First a larger subject pool is required; perhaps due in 
part to the creatively demanding nature of the task it, was 
difficult to get enough participants to obtain statistically 
significant results. Second, in future studies that use this 
protocol, more time should be spent with the judges to 
ensure that they can consistently judge the more open-ended 
questions (Forms B and C) as well as the more clear-cut 
question on Form D. Future research should also investigate 
the role of potentiality states in other types of creative tasks. 
Another aspect of the study that could be improved is the 
questionnaires. Future studies should expand on the types of 
questions and carry out extensive pilot studies to assess their 
inter-rater reliability in order to tap into the cognitive 
processes during a creative task more adequately. In 
addition, the questionnaires could be complimented by 
behavioral observations of the artsts at work so as to not be 
relying completely on self- perceptions of their creative 
process. Nevertheless we view the results as a promising 
step forward to empirically investigating the cognitive 
process by which creative works come into being.  
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